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Abstract
Statistical modeling can involve a tension between assumptions and statistical
identification. The law of the observable data may not uniquely determine the value
of a target parameter without invoking a key assumption, and, while plausible, this
assumption may not be obviously true in the scientific context at hand. Moreover,
there are many instances of key assumptions which are untestable, hence we cannot
rely on the data to resolve the question of whether the target is legitimately identified.
Working in the Bayesian paradigm, we consider the grey zone of situations where a key
assumption, in the form of a parameter space restriction, is scientifically reasonable
but not incontrovertible for the problem being tackled. Specifically, we investigate
statistical properties that ensue if we structure a prior distribution to assert that
maybe or perhaps the assumption holds. Technically this simply devolves to using
a mixture prior distribution putting just some prior weight on the assumption, or
one of several assumptions, holding. However, while the construct is straightforward,
there is very little literature discussing situations where Bayesian model averaging is
employed across a mix of fully identified and partially identified models.
Keywords: Bayesian model averaging; Bayes risk; large-sample theory; partial identifica-
tion.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In many applications of statistical modeling, a tension can arise. In order to fully identify
a parameter of interest, one or more “strong” model assumptions may be required. Of
course it is not prudent to invoke an assumption without a solid rationale for doing so. If
identification is not obtained, however, then an uncomfortable truth ensues: even an infinite
amount of data would not reveal the true value of the target parameter. To further muddy
the waters, often an assumption that would identify the target is not testable empirically.
So we cannot necessarily rely on the data to resolve the situation.
Say we are faced with a context where an identifying assumption or parameter restriction
is scientifically plausible but not incontrovertible. One strategy, at least within the Bayesian
paradigm, is to specify a prior distribution asserting that “large” violations of the restriction
are unlikely. For instance, say the restriction takes the form λ = 0. Then a prior of the form
λ ∼ N(0, τ 2), for a suitably small choice of τ , could encode this information. For instance,
some efforts along this line in the context of instrumental variable problems are pursued by
Gustafson and Greenland (2006); Gustafson (2007). And more generally in observational
epidemiology settings, “Bayesian-like” approaches, often referred to as probabilistic bias
analysis, have been considered (Greenland, 2003, 2005; Lash et al., 2009, 2014).
Assigning a prior distribution which probabilistically limits the magnitude of violation
for an identifying restriction is not the only way to proceed. In fact, an arguably more
direct encoding of “plausible but not incontrovertible” would result from a specification
of a mixture prior distribution, giving some weight to the restriction being met exactly,
and the remaining weight on it being violated (without necessarily making a stringent
judgement that the violation is unlikely to be large). While mixture prior distributions are
ubiquitous in Bayesian hypothesis testing and model selection procedures, there is scant
literature on their use in the context of identifying restrictions.
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1.2 Motivating Example: Prevalence Estimation with Missing
Data
To motivate the developments to follow, consider the HIV surveillance study described by
Verstraeten et al. (1998), which was also used to motivate the methodological developments
in Vansteelandt et al. (2006). In this study, blood draws were taken from a sample of
n = 787 members of the target population. At a population level, let Y indicate the HIV
test result (0 for negative, 1 for positive), let R indicate the observation of the result (1
for observed, 0 for missing), and let pry = Pr(R = r, Y = y). Hence the target parameter,
HIV prevalence, can be expressed as ψ = Pr(Y = 1) = p01 + p11. The study data are
summarized by c10 = 699 negative HIV tests (R = 1, Y = 0), c11 = 52 positive HIV tests
(R = 1, Y = 1), and c0+ = 36 missing test results (R = 0).
Say we proceed to infer ψ without invoking any identifying restriction, i.e., we allow
that the missing data mechanism may be nonignorable (see Daniels and Hogan (2008)
or Little and Rubin (2014) for full discussions of nonignorable missingness). A possible
“neutral” prior specification is (p00, p01, p10, p11) ∼ Dirichlet(1, 1, 1, 1). By reparameterizing
to (s, p0+, p10, p11), where p0+ = p00 +p01 and s = p01/(p00 +p01), the posterior distribution
is characterized by (p0+, p10, p11) ∼ Dirichlet(2 + c0+, 1 + c10, 1 + c11) and independently
s ∼ Unif(0, 1). In turn this induces the marginal posterior distribution on the target
ψ = sp0+ + p11. Here the impact of not having an identifying restriction is clear. Since the
posterior distribution of s is Unif(0, 1) for any dataset, the posterior distribution of ψ will
not reduce to a point-mass in the infinite limit of further data collection. For the data at
hand, the posterior distribution of ψ is depicted in Figure 1.
Alternately, say we believe the missing-at-random assumption is justified, i.e., we pre-
sume R to be independent of Y . Then a possible neutral prior specification is to let
pry = (1 − γ)1−rγr(1 − ψ)1−yψy, with γ = Pr(R = 1) and ψ = Pr(Y = 1) independently
and identically distributed as Unif(0, 1). Under this specification, the marginal posterior
distribution of the target parameter ψ is simply beta(1+c11, 1+c10). Clearly this posterior
distribution will concentrate to a point-mass in the infinite limit of further data collection.
For the data at hand, the posterior is also depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Posterior distribution of HIV prevalence without an identifying restriction (al-
lowing nonignorable missingness, NIM), with the missing-at-random (MAR) restriction,
and the Bayesian model averaged (BMA) synthesis of the two distributions.
For an investigator having good reason to believe that the MAR assumption might hold,
a natural route to expressing this belief is through a model-averaging prior. See Hoeting
et al. (1999) or Wasserman (2000) for a full discussion of Bayesian model averaging (BMA).
Specifically, the prior for (p00, p01, p10, p11) is taken as a mixture of the two specifications
above. It is a matter of conjugate updating algebra to verify that the Bayes factor contrast-
ing the two specifications (with MAR in the numerator versus NIM in the denominator)
is:
b =
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
6(c0+ + 1)(n− c0+ + 1) , (1)
which evaluates to b = 3.73 for the present data. Of course the posterior odds favoring the
MAR specification are b times the prior odds. For instance, if the mixture prior gives equal
weights of 0.5 to each of the NIM and MAR specifications, then for the present data the
mixture posterior gives weight 0.211 to the NIM posterior and weight 0.789 to the MAR
posterior. This model-averaged posterior for the target is also depicted in Figure 1.
With both the NIM and MAR “within-model” prior specifications being neutral in some
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sense, it may be surprising that a Bayes factor of nearly four is obtained, given that MAR
is well known to be an untestable assumption. Similarly, it may be surprising to see from
the form of (1) how sensitive the Bayes factor is to the proportion of data that are missing.
This begs the question of what statistical properties are possessed by the model-averaged
inference scheme in a context such as this. In general there is a rich literature on Bayesian
model averaging. We are not aware, however, of any focus on the case when one constituent
model does not identify the target parameter, while the other model, or models, impose
identifying restrictions. Thus the rationale for the present work is to quantify statistical
performance specifically when model averaging is used to declare the a priori supposition
that perhaps an identifying restriction holds.
2 Framework
Say that the initial statistical model at hand, which we refer to as M0, is parameterized by
θ = (φ, λ). Here, in the terminology of Gustafson (2015), this is taken to be a transparent
parameterization, with the distribution of the data depending on θ only through φ. Or,
put more directly in Bayesian terms, the data D are conditionally independent of λ, given
φ. The lack of full identification is thus made clear: the data inform φ (indeed we presume
that they fully inform φ, in the sense that the (D|φ) model supports consistent estimation
of φ). However, for any dataset, the posterior conditional distribution of (λ|φ) is the same
as the prior conditional distribution. In what follows, the primary target of inference is
expressed as ψ = g(φ, λ). Provided that g() varies non-trivially with λ, the target is not
fully identified.
Whereas we write the overall parameter space for M0 as θ ∈ Θ0, we let the marginal
parameter spaces implied by Θ0 be φ ∈ Φ0 and λ ∈ Λ0. Importantly, many partially
identified models that arise in practice are such that φ and λ are not variation independent,
with the consequence that direct learning about φ from the observed data may induce
some indirect learning about λ, via the support of λ depending on φ (Gustafson, 2015) .
Commensurately, note for future reference that Θ0 may be a proper subset of the Cartesian
space Φ0 × Λ0.
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We consider one or more sub-models of M0, each of which has some level of a priori
scientific credence, and each of which identifies the target. We express the j-th of J ≥
1 such sub-models as Mj: θ ∈ Θj ⊂ Θ0. That restriction of θ to the j-th sub-model
identifies the target implies that over (φ, λ) ∈ Θj, g(φ, λ) does not vary with λ. Stated
more pragmatically, if Mj holds, then φ, the value of which can be learned from the data,
uniquely determines the target ψ.
As alluded to in the previous section, the framework allowing the user to postulate
that perhaps one of the identifying restriction holds is that of BMA. Let pij() be the prior
density specified for θ within model Mj. Then the BMA prior distribution is a mixture,
whose density takes the form:
piMIX(θ) =
J∑
j=0
wjpij(θ), (2)
where wj = Pr(Mj) is the prior probability that model Mj is correct, hence
∑J
j=0wj = 1.
As a technical note, we presume that each sub-model has zero probability under pi0() (as
well as under the other sub-models). Consequently, it is not necessary to explicitly define
the support of pi0() as excluding the sub-models.
Upon receipt of data D, standard Bayesian updating from the mixture prior (2) gives
the posterior distribution as a mixture:
piMIX(θ|D) =
J∑
j=0
w˜j(D)pij(θ|D).
Here pij(θ|D) is the standard “within-model” posterior distribution of parameters, i.e.,
based on pij(θ|D) ∝ L(θ;D)pij(θ), for likelihood function L(; ). And w˜j(D) is the posterior
probability that Mj is correct. In the usual fashion,
w˜j(D) =
wjfj(D)∑J
k=0wkfk(D)
,
where fj(D) =
∫
Θj
L(θ;D)pij(θ)dθ is the marginal density of the data under the j-th model.
While the framework above is standard, its implications are unexplored when the list of
candidate models is a mix of partially and fully identified models. To large extent, estimator
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behaviour will be seen to be specific to the particular choice of partially identified model
and identified sub-models, and to the nature of the specified within-model priors. However,
to foreshadow the examples which follow, there are situations where:
• For every dataset, w˜1(D)/w˜0(D) = w1/w0, i.e., the data have zero ability to discrim-
inate between the base model and an identified sub-model.
• For data generated under some parameter values in Θ0 −Θ1, w˜1(D) tends to zero as
more data accumulate, but under other such values the limit is positive. That is, a
falsely asserted restriction may or may not be fully refuted.
• As the underlying θ ranges over Θ0, the large-sample limit of w˜1(D) takes values in
[c, 1), where c > 0. Since the limit is never zero or one, the restriction can never be
fully refuted or fully supported. Also, since c is positive, there are not parameter
values under which we get close to complete refutation of the restriction. In the other
direction, however, there are parameter values under which we get arbitrarily close
to full support for the restriction.
Thus we find a surprising richness in the variety of behaviors that can be encountered.
Toward understanding the structure of the posterior model weights in our present frame-
work, note that
fj(D) =
∫
Θj
L(θ)pij(θ)dθ
=
∫
Θj
L(φ)pij(φ, λ)dφ dλ
=
∫
Φj
L(φ)pij(φ)dφ.
Thus the marginal prior distribution of φ arising from the specified joint prior on (φ, λ) plays
a key role. Asymptotically, imagine a datastream of independent observations generated
under true parameter values (φ, λ) = (φ†, λ†). (We will generally use the ‘dagger’ notation
to emphasize specific parameter values that give rise to the observable data.) Let Dn denote
the first n observations, and let w?j = limn→∞ w˜(Dn) be the limiting posterior weight on
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the j-th model. Then we immediately have
w?j
w?k
=
{
lim
n→∞
fj(Dn)
fk(Dn)
}(
wj
wk
)
=
{
pij(φ
†)
pik(φ†)
}(
wj
wk
)
. (3)
Just as we can characterize the limiting posterior weights on models, we can also char-
acterize the limiting values of within-models estimators. Generically, let ψˆ(D; piI) be the
posterior mean of the target ψ arising from the prior specification piI and data D, where
the I subscript reminds us this is the investigator’s choice of prior distribution. It is easy
to verify that without an identifying restriction we have
ψ?0
.
= lim
n→∞
ψˆ(Dn; pi0)
=
∫
g(φ†, λ)pi0(λ|φ†)dλ.
We can similarly define ψ?j
.
= limn→∞ ψˆ(Dn; pij) for j > 0. Specifically, when the inves-
tigator invokes the j-th restriction, provided that φ† ∈ Φj, we can express the limit as
ψ?j = g(φ
†, ·), upon recalling that g(φ, λ) is constant in λ when (φ, λ) ∈ Θj. In a situation
where φ† /∈ Φj, typically misspecified model theory (e.g., White (1982)) would be needed to
determine ψ?j . Assembling the pieces thus far, the large-sample limit of the BMA posterior
mean is
ψ?MIX
.
=
J∑
j=0
w?jψ
?
j .
We quantify the performance of estimators by averaging frequentist performance across
the parameter space. If data were generated under parameter value θ, the estimator
ψˆ(D; piI) would incur mean-squared error (MSE) of Eθ
[
{ψˆ(D; piI)− ψ(θ)}2
]
. We then
average the MSE across different underlying parameter values θ, according to θ ∼ piN(),
where the subscript N serves to remind us that this is Nature’s choice of prior distribution.
For data Dn with sample size n, then, the average mean-squared error (AMSE) is:
AMSEn(piN , piI)
.
= EpiNEθ
[{
ψˆ(Dn; piI)− ψ(θ)
}2]
. (4)
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Note that we quite deliberately keep both the ‘A’ and the ‘M’ in ‘AMSE,’ to remind us
that two averagings are in play: the mean (M) of squared error across Dn given θ, distinct
from the averaging (A) of this result across θ.
Standard decision-theoretic terminology would see (4) referred to as the Bayes risk
under piN . Indeed, standard arguments tell us that for fixed piN , (4) is minimized by taking
piI = piN , and that in fact this is the minimum achievable across all estimators, not just
those arising as Bayesian estimators from some choice of prior. As a further formality,
we will largely focus on the large-sample limit. Notationally we achieve this by defining
AMSE() = limn→∞AMSEn(). Also, for the sake of interpretability we will tend to report
the square root of AMSE, i.e., RAMSE = AMSE1/2.
The Nature versus investigator prior framework embedded in (4) seems particularly
applicable to quantifying the pros and cons of “maybe” assertions about identified sub-
models. We can compute AMSE(piN , piI) for the four combinations arising from piI ∈
{pi0, piMIX} and piN ∈ {pi0, piMIX}. Necessarily, AMSE(piMIX , piMIX) is lower than (or
possibly equal to) AMSE(piMIX , pi0). The extent to which it is lower reflects the benefit
of making “maybe” assertions in contexts where appropriate, since setting piN = piMIX
implies we are studying average-case performance across a mix of scenarios some with, and
some without, one of the identifying restrictions being true.
On the other hand, AMSE(pi0, piMIX) is guaranteed to be higher than (or possibly
equal to) AMSE(pi0, pi0), and the extent to which it is higher reflects the risk of inappro-
priately making “maybe” assertions. That is, across scenarios where none of the identifying
restrictions hold, making the maybe assertions increases average-case MSE. So, if we re-
gard invoking “maybe” restrictions in contexts where all the identified sub-models are a
priori implausible as a form of cheating, then the extent to which AMSE(pi0, piMIX) ex-
ceeds AMSE(pi0, pi0) is the extent to which cheating results in empirically worse estimation
performance.
It is important to note that the AMSE comparisons just outlined could be applied in
a fully identified setting. That is, say that ψ were identified under M0, and consequently
also identified under each sub-model Mj, j = 1, . . . J . For a finite sample size n, the
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four AMSEn values would still have the interpretations given above, quantifying both the
value and the risk of speculating that the sub-models are a priori plausible. However, all
four AMSEn values would tend to zero as n tends to infinity, since both ψˆ(Dn; pi0) and
ψˆ(Dn; piMIX) would consistently estimate ψ, under any values of θ ∈ Θ. Conversely, in the
situation we study, with ψ not identified under M0, consistent estimation does not arise.
Hence the positive large-sample limits of the AMSE values are fundamental descriptors of
the situation.
3 Example 1: Prevalence Estimation with Missing
Data
For a first example of quantifying performance, we simply return to the motivating example
of Section 1.2. Here M0 is the NIM specification which does not fully identify the target,
whereas M1 is the MAR specification which does. The particular prior specifications pi0()
and pi1() are those given in Section 1.2. From the posterior forms, we see the posterior mean
of the disease prevalence ψ has large-sample limit ψ?0 = p
†
11 + p
†
0+/2 when the investigator
presumes NIM, but ψ?1 = p
†
11/p
†
1+ when the investigator presumes MAR.
The respective prior marginal densities of φ = (p0+, p10, p11) are readily obtained. Ex-
pressed as densities for (p0+, p11) over the lower triangle of the unit square (rather than
densities over the probability simplex), we have pi0(p0+, p11) = 6p0+ for the NIM specifica-
tion, and pi1(p0+, p11) = (1− p0+)−1. Consequently the limiting Bayes factor is
w?1/w
?
0
w1/w0
=
1
6p†0+(1− p†0+)
.
Note that this expression could also be deduced by direct inspection of (1) when n increases.
Based on the prior specifications and the limiting posterior forms, and taking w =
(0.5, 0.5), we have the following analytic expressions:
AMSE(pi0, pi0) = Epi0
{
(p01 − p00)2
4
}
=
1
40
,
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and
AMSE(piMIX , pi0) = (1/2)Epi0
{
(p01 − p00)2
4
}
+ (1/2)Epi1
{
(p01 − p00)2
4
}
=
1
2
(
1
40
+
1
36
)
.
The other two quantities needed take the form AMSE(pi0, piMIX) = Epi0 {w(p)2} and
AMSE(piMIX , piMIX) = (1/2)Epi0 {w(p)2}+ (1/2)Epi1 {w(p)2}, where
w(p) =
6p0+p1+
1 + 6p0+p1+
(
p11 +
p0+
2
)
+
1
1 + 6p0+p1+
(
p11
p1+
)
− p+1.
Given the nonlinearity of w(), the needed expectations do not have analytic forms. They
are easily evaluated numerically, however, say via Monte Carlo draws from pi0() and pi1().
Table 1 gives the four AMSE values. On the pro side, appropriate use of the “maybe”
assertion leads to a 16% reduction in RAMSE compared to no assertion, i.e., we see this
reduction when Nature’s prior is the mixture, so we are averaging performance across
some scenarios where the assertion holds and others when it does not. On the con side,
inappropriate use of the “maybe” assertion leads to a 12% increase in RAMSE. This is seen
when Nature’s prior is pi0 alone, so we are averaging performance across scenarios which
all involve nonignorable missingness.
4 Example 2: Estimating an Average Risk Difference
from Stratified Data
Say that interest lies in the distribution of three binary variables, (C,X, Y ), in a population.
Here C is a potential confounding variable, X is an exposure variable, and Y is a health
outcome variable. The particular target of inferential interest is taken to be the average
risk difference, ψ = E{E(Y |X = 1, C)−E(Y |X = 0, C)}. (As an aside, this target can be
motivated as an average treatment effects in a framework using counterfactual outcomes,
under an assumption that the counterfactual outcomes are conditionally independent of
X given C.) Say the available data, however, are sampled conditional on C. That is,
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Table 1: RAMSE values for different combinations of Nature’s prior and the investigator’s
prior, in Example 1. Values in the first column are exact. Values in the second column are
computed as Monte Carlo averages based on 105 draws from each of pi0() and pi1(). The
impact of the investigator using piMIX rather than pi0 is a 11.8% increase in RAMSE when
this use is not warranted, but a 16.0% decrease in RAMSE when it is warranted. The
Monte Carlo standard errors for these two percentage changes are 0.3 percentage points
and 0.2 percentage points, respectively.
Investigator
pi0 piMIX
Nature pi0 0.158 0.177
piMIX 0.162 0.136
a pre-specified number of realizations n0 are drawn from (Y,X|C = 0), and similarly a
pre-specified number of realizations n1 are drawn from (Y,X|C = 1).
For this problem, let φ = (φ0, φ1), where φc comprises the (X, Y |C = c) cell probabilities
(so φc has three elements, with the fourth cell probability consequently determined since
these probabilities must sum to one). Also, let λ = Pr(C = 1). Then (φ, λ) is a transparent
parameterization, with the likelihood L(φ) = L0(φ0)L1(φ1) based on two independent
multinomial samples. The target parameter can be expressed as g(φ, λ) = (1 − λ)v(φ0) +
λv(φ1), where v() returns the risk difference from a single set of cell probabilities. For the
partially identified model M0 we specify a prior with independencies of the form pi0(φ, λ) =
pi0(φ0)pi0(φ1)pi0(λ). For future reference, let λ¯ and σ
2
λ be the mean and variance of λ under
the specified prior.
The first identifying restriction we consider is that the prevalence of C is exactly known
from external sources, i.e., M1 is defined as the sub-model of M0 defined by λ = λ˜, where
λ˜ is user-specified. We express this model via the prior specification pi1(φ, λ) = pi1(φ)δλ˜(λ),
where δx() is the Dirac delta function, i.e., the ‘density’ of a point-mass at x. We take
pi1(φ) = pi0(φ) as before, but now λ = λ˜ is taken as known.
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The second identifying restriction we consider is that there is no interaction on the risk
difference scale. Hence we obtain model M2 from model M0 by constraining φ according
to v(φ0) = v(φ1). An appropriate prior specification for the marginal pi2(φ) would be the
distribution induced from pi0(φ) by conditioning on v(φ0) = v(φ1). For M2 we can leave
pi2(λ|φ) unspecified, since it will play no role whatsoever in the posterior distribution of ψ
or in the posterior weight of M2 relative to the other two models.
From the forms of pij(φ) for j = 0, 1, 2 we have a very simple characterization of the
limiting posterior model weights:
(w?0, w
?
1, w
?
2) =
 (0, 0, 1) if v(φ
†
0) = v(φ
†
1);
(w0 + w1)
−1(w0, w1, 0) otherwise.
(5)
Specifically, M1 is completely untestable compared to M0, in the sense that f0(D) = f1(D)
for every dataset. On the other hand M2 is completely testable compared to M0, in the
sense that the constraint v(φ0) = v(φ1) is either proven or disproven in the limit of infinite
sample size.
In terms of inference within models, under M0 it is immediate that the posterior distri-
bution of (ψ|φ) is a location-scale shift of the prior distribution of λ [with location v(φ0)
and scale v(φ1)−v(φ0)]. The limiting posterior mean of ψ is then v(φ†0)+{v(φ†1)−v(φ†0)}λ¯.
Whereas, in a related spirit, under M1 the limiting posterior mean is v(φ
†
0) + {v(φ†1) −
v(φ†0)}λ˜. This limit does or does not match with the target ψ† depending on whether M1
holds. If M2 holds, then asymptotically the M2 posterior will concentrate at the correct
value of v(φ†0) = v(φ
†
1). The limiting posterior mean under M2 when M2 does not hold is
governed by standard wrong-model asymptotic theory (e.g., see White (1982)). We will
not need to determine this limit, however, as M2 is discredited when it is wrong, as per
(5).
Armed with (5) and the limiting posterior means of ψ under each model, we proceed to
determine AMSE for the four combinations of Nature’s prior and the investigator’s prior
based on pi0() or piMIX(). Letting k = Var{v(φ1)− v(φ0)} = 2Var{v(φc} under pi0(), direct
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calculation gives:
AMSE(pi0; pi0) = kσ
2
λ,
AMSE(pi0; piMIX) = k
[
σ2λ + {w2/(w1 + w2)}2
(
λ˜− λ¯
)2]
,
AMSE(piMIX ; pi0) = k
{
w0σ
2
λ + w1
(
λ˜− λ¯
)2}
,
AMSE(piMIX ; piMIX) = k
{
w0σ
2
λ +
w0w1
w0 + w1
(
λ˜− λ¯
)2}
.
Note that these expressions are sufficiently simple that one can “read off” the extent to
whichAMSE(pi0; piMIX) exceedsAMSE(pi0; pi0) and the extent to whichAMSE(piMIX ; piMIX)
is reduced compared to AMSE(piMIX ; pi0). Note also that both these gaps collapse to zero
in situations where λ¯ (the prior mean of λ under model M0) equals λ˜ (the presumed value
of λ under Model M1).
To give a concrete example, say that external information leads to the specification of
λ˜ = 0.15 for the identifying restriction under M1. And say the same information suggests
the prior λ ∼ Beta(4, 18) under Model M0, giving the prior mode at 0.15, as well as
a prior mean of λ¯ = 4/22 and prior variance of σ2λ = (4/22)(18/22)(1/23) ≈ 0.00647.
Using a uniform prior on cell probabilities, i.e., φc ∼ Dirichlet(1, 1, 1, 1), gives k = 1/3.
Presuming equal prior weights on the models, (w0, w1, w2) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), the resulting
RAMSE values are given in Table 2. These characterize the present setting as one of low
stakes. Imposing the maybe restrictions when not warranted only carries a 1.9% increase
in RAMSE (as per the first row of the table). While imposing the maybe restrictions when
warranted only carries a 3.5% reduction in RAMSE (as per the second row of the table).
5 Example 3: Estimating a Risk Difference with Pos-
sible Outcome Misclassification
In a somewhat similar spirit to Example 2, say we are interested in the risk difference
Pr(Y = 1|X = 1)−Pr(Y = 1|X = 0), for binary variablesX and Y . However, the available
data are a sample of (X, Y ∗) realizations, where Y ∗ may be an imperfect surrogate for Y ,
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Table 2: RAMSE values for different combinations of Nature’s prior and the investigator’s
prior in Example 2. The impact of the investigator using piMIX rather than pi0 is a 1.9%
increase when this use is not warranted, but a 3.5% decrease when it is warranted.
Investigator
pi0 piMIX
Nature pi0 0.0464 0.0473
piMIX 0.0288 0.0278
while Y itself is latent. Specifically, say Y ∗ and X are conditionally independent given Y
(the so-called “nondifferential” assumption), with λy = Pr(Y
∗ = Y |Y = y), i.e, λ0 and
λ1 are respectively the specificity and sensitivity of the surrogate. Letting ωx = Pr(Y =
1|X = x), the target of inference is ψ = ω1 − ω0. At present we have parameterized
the problem at hand by (ω, λ). However, to obtain a transparent parameterization we
reparameterize to (φ, λ), where φ = (φ0, φ1) has components φx = Pr(Y
∗ = 1|X = x) =
(1− ωx)(1− λ0) + ωxλ1. With respect to this parameterization, the target is expressed as
ψ = (φ1 − φ0)/(λ0 + λ1 − 1).
We complete the specification of model M0 by assigning a prior distribution in the
original parameterization. We let ω follow a uniform distribution over (0, 1)2, and indepen-
dently we let λ follow a uniform distribution over (a0, 1) × (a1, 1). Thus hyperparameters
a0 and a1 are worst-case assertions about the magnitude of outcome misclassification. (We
presume a0 > 0.5 and a1 > 0.5 for technical reasons, which rules out placing any prior mass
on a negative dependence between Y and Y ∗.) Note that the specified prior independence
between ω and λ is intuitive; there seems no reason to tie prior assertions about the (Y |X)
prevalences to prior assertions about the quality of Y ∗ as a surrogate for Y . (And note
also that it would be impossible to assert prior independence of φ and λ, since the support
of λ depends on φ.)
Upon moving to the transparent parameterization, following the related model formu-
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lation in Gustafson et al. (2001), we find the M0 prior density transforms to
pi0(φ, λ) =
IA(φ, λ)
(1− a0)(1− a1)(λ0 + λ1 − 1)2 . (6)
Here A is the intersection of three sets, imposing the restrictions that: (i), φ ∈ (0, 1)2; (ii),
λ ∈ (a0, 1) × (a1, 1); and (iii), φ and λ are compatible with each other in that (1 − λ0) <
φx < λ1, for x = 0, 1.
The identifying restriction we consider is the assertion that the outcome classification
is perfect. So M1 is the sub-model of M0 defined by λ = (1, 1)
′. Under M1 we take the
prior on φ to be uniform over (0, 1)2. This is consistent with M0 in that it matches the
(φ|λ = (1, 1)′) prior.
For a datastream arising under φ = φ†, we have the limiting Bayes factor pi1(φ†)/pi0(φ†)
as per (3). For the present prior specifications, pi1(φ) = 1, while marginalizing (6) gives:
pi0(φ) =
1
(1− a0)(1− a1) [log b0(φ) + log b1(φ)− log{b0(φ) + b1(φ)− 1}] , (7)
where b0(φ) = max{a0, 1 − φ0, 1 − φ1} and b1(φ) = max{a1, φ0, φ1}. Upon scrutiny, the
bivariate density (7) over the unit square is seen to have a “tabletop” shape. It is constant
at its maximum value over the square defined by min{φ0, φ1} > 1− a0 and max{φ0, φ1} <
a1. Whereas the density falls off as φ moves away from this square, with pi0(φ) → 0 as
min{φ0, φ1} → 0 or max{φ0, φ1} → 1.
The shape of (7) has clear implications for what the data can say about the identifying
restriction. Say we are working with even prior models odds, w = (0.5, 0.5)′. Then, for a
datastream generated under a value of φ† within the “tabletop” square mentioned above,
w?1/w
?
0 = {(1− a0)(1− a1)}/[log{a0a1/(a0 + a1 − 1)}].
This provides a bound on the extent of criticism the data can provide against the identified
sub-model. On the other hand, there are values of φ† outside the square for which w?1/w
?
0 is
arbitrarily large. Thus circumstances exist under which the data can provide strong support
for the identified sub-model. Of course we must remember that this strong support is not
as strong as would be seen if M0 were identified, in which case either w
? = (0, 1)′ or
w? = (1, 0)′.
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Figure 2: Distribution of w?1, the limiting posterior weight on M1, in Example 3. The
panels correspond to parameter ensembles for which M0 (left) and M1 (right) are true.
Hyperparameters are a = (0.85, 0.85)′ and w = (0.5, 0.5)′.
To better convey the ability of data to discriminate between M0 and M1, we examine the
distribution of w? arising for two ensembles of φ† values, with the first ensemble generated
by sampling from pi0() and the second by sampling from pi1(). We do so in the context
of hyperparameter setting (a0, a1) = (0.85, 0.85) for pi0(), along with equal a priori model
weights, (w0, w1) = (0.5, 0.5). The two ensembles of the limiting posterior model weight
w?1 appear in Figure 1. As we might expect, we see relatively more mass at the lower
boundary for w?1 when M1 is false. And in fact for the present hyperparameter values this
lower boundary is 0.416, representing a very limited scope for criticism of M1. Also, as
per the discussion above, we see the right tail of the w?1 values approaching one when M1
is true, i.e., there are occasional circumstances where the data can strongly support the
identifying restriction.
In terms of limiting posterior means for the target, when the investigator presumes M1,
the limit is simply ψ?1 = φ
†
1 − φ†0. For M0, numerical integration is required to obtain ψ?0
for a given φ†. Specifically, ψ?0 =
∫
g(φ†, λ)pi0(λ|φ†)dλ, where the prior conditional density
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Table 3: RAMSE values for different combinations of Nature’s prior and the investigator’s
prior in Example 3. Each value is computed as a Monte Carlo average, using 20000 real-
izations from each of pi0() and pi1(). The impact of the investigator using piMIX rather than
pi0 is a 44.8% increase in RAMSE when this use is not warranted, but a 24.9% decrease
in RAMSE when it is warranted. Monte Carlo standard errors for these two percentage
changes are 0.9 percentage points and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.
Investigator
pi0 piMIX
Nature pi0 0.0270 0.0391
piMIX 0.0462 0.0347
for (λ|φ) is derived from the joint density (6).
The RAMSE values are given in Table 3. We now see rather higher stakes than were
manifested in Example 2. Imposing the maybe restriction when not warranted incurs a
penalty of a 45% increase in RAMSE (as per the first row of the table). Whereas imposing
the maybe restriction when warranted produces a 25% reduction in RAMSE (as per the
second row of the table).
6 Example 4: Estimating an Average Risk Difference
with Possible Exposure Misclassification
Our final, and most complex, example blends elements of Examples 2 and 3. As per
Example 2, say we are interested in properties of the joint distribution of (C,X, Y ), where C
is a binary confounding variable, X is a binary exposure variable, and Y is a binary outcome
variable. Also as per Example 2, the target of inference is presumed to be the average risk
difference, ψ = E{Pr(Y = 1|X = 1, C)−Pr(Y = 1|X = 0, C)}. However, the exposure X
may be subject to misclassification. Hence the observable variables are (C,X∗, Y ), where
the surrogate X∗ may differ from the exposure of interest, X. We confine attention to a
18
simple form of exposure misclassification. We take it as known that the misclassification is
nondifferential, in the sense that X∗ is conditionally independent of (C, Y ) given X. And
we also take it as known that Pr(X∗ = 0|X = 0) = 1, i.e., the classification scheme has
perfect specificity. However, the sensitivity, λ = Pr(X∗ = 1|X = 1), may be less than one.
Some recent work on Bayesian inference in problems with “unidirectional” misclassification
of this form includes Xia and Gustafson (2016, 2018).
6.1 Convenience Prior and Posterior
To organize prior specification and posterior computation across the multiple models at
hand, it is helpful to specify a convenience prior distribution which in turn produces a
convenience posterior distribution possessing a simple form. Then appropriate model-
specific prior specifications and posterior calculations can be expressed in terms of tweaks
to the convenience analysis.
Let Pd be the space of probability vectors over d mutually distinct and exhaustive
outcomes, and let φ ∈ P8 be the cell probabilities describing the distribution of (C,X∗, Y ).
We specify the convenience prior density on θ = (φ, λ) to be pi∗(φ, λ) = pi∗(φ)pi∗(λ), where
pi∗(φ) is the Dirichlet(1, . . . , 1) density, while pi∗(λ) is the Uniform(b, 1) density, where
hyperparameter b is an a priori specified lower bound on the sensitivity of the exposure
classification. For illustration, we take b = 0.5 throughout.
6.2 Model M0
In the absence of any identifying restrictions, a first thought is that the convenience prior
might be employed as the actual prior. This is not actually possible, however, since we do
not have a Cartesian parameter space for (φ, λ). For a given sensitivity λ, let sλ() map
from the (C,X, Y ) cell probabilities to the (C,X∗, Y ) cell probabilities. Hence sλ() maps
from P8 to its image Sλ ⊂ P8. This map is invertible, and for a given φ ∈ P8 it is possible
to numerically determine whether φ ∈ Sλ, and, if so, compute s−1λ (φ). Thus an obvious
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adaptation of the convenience prior is to take the Model M0 prior as:
pi0(φ, λ) =
pi∗(φ, λ)I{φ ∈ Sλ}
Pr∗{φ ∈ Sλ} . (8)
Thus we simply truncate the convenience prior to only those φ and λ pairs which are
compatible with each other.
It is also possible to establish that for a given φ ∈ P8, φ ∈ Sλ if and only if λ exceeds a
threshold. That is, the cell probabilities for the observables (C,X∗, Y ) imply a lower bound
on the sensitivity of X∗ as a surrogate for X. (Note that this bound may or may not exceed
the investigator-specified lower bound b.) Using t(φ) to denote this lower bound, we have
φ ∈ Sλ if and only if λ > t(φ). Combined with the specification of pi∗(λ) as Unif(b, 1), (8)
can be simplified to:
pi0(φ, λ) =
pi∗(φ, λ)I[λ > max{b, t(φ)}]
(1− b)−1E∗[1−max{b, t(φ)}] .
Importantly, this marginalizes to
pi0(φ) =
pi∗(φ)[1−max{b, t(φ)}]
E∗[1−max{b, t(φ)}] . (9)
In terms of the parameter of interest, say that g˜() maps from the (C,X, Y ) cell proba-
bilities to the target parameter, i.e., g˜() returns E{E(Y |X = 1, C)− E(Y |X = 0, C)}. In
the parameterization at hand then, the target parameter is g(φ, λ) = g˜(s−1λ (φ)).
6.3 Model M1
In a similar spirit to Example 3, the first identifying restriction considered is simply that
the surrogate X∗ is in fact perfect. So model M1 is the sub-model of M0 corresponding to
λ = 1. An obvious prior specification is
pi1(φ, λ) = pi∗(φ)δ1(λ).
This simply marginalizes to
pi1(φ) = pi∗(φ). (10)
Under this restriction φ is identically the (C,X, Y ) cell probabilities. Hence the target
parameter is simply expressed as g(φ) = g˜(φ).
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6.4 Model M2
Model M2 renders the target identifiable via a different restriction on M0. Namely, as per
Example 2, we presume the (C,X, Y ) distribution does not involve any interaction on the
risk difference scale, so that E(Y |X = 1, C = c)−E(Y |X = 0, C = c) does not depend on
c. If we let φ˜ parameterize the so restricted (C,X, Y ) cell probabilities (so that φ˜ has only
six degrees of freedom), then the resultant (C,X∗, Y ) cell probabilities can be expressed
as h(φ˜, λ). Here the map h() is invertible. However, its image, which we denote as H, is a
strict subset of P8. While it does not seem possible to express h−1() in closed form, for a
given φ ∈ P8 one can numerically determine whether φ ∈ H, and, if so, compute h−1(φ).
A sensible prior construction for M2 thus takes the form:
pi2(φ, λ) =
pi∗(φ)IH(φ)
Pr∗(φ ∈ H)δm(φ)(λ),
where m(φ) is the unique sensitivity value implied by φ. Clearly this prior marginalizes to
pi2(φ) =
pi∗(φ)IH(φ)
Pr∗(φ ∈ H) . (11)
Note that the parameter of interest in this formulation, the constant risk difference, can
be simply expressed as one element from h−1(φ).
6.5 Limiting Inference across models
The limiting posterior model weights are governed by (9), (10), and (11), giving
w?0/w
?
1
w0/w1
=
1−max{b, t (φ†)}
1− E∗[max{b, t(φ)}] , (12)
and
w?2/w
?
1
w2/w1
=
 {Pr∗(φ ∈ H)}−1 if φ† ∈ H,0 otherwise. (13)
From (12) we see that the data can offer some mild discrimination between M0 and M1,
in that a positive and finite limiting Bayes factor arises. Moreover, this limit is not one
(except for a set of φ† values with probability zero under all three model-specific priors).
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Of course we are reminded that this is indeed mild discrimination, since the limiting Bayes
factor would be zero or infinity if M0 were identified. From (13) we see that when M2
is false, enough data may or may not discredit it. That is, the true model (either M0 or
M1) may give rise to φ
† /∈ H, in which case M2 is discredited asymptotically. However,
any of the three models can yield φ† ∈ H, and (13) cannot distinguish between the three
situations. Note that if M2 is not discredited, then it necessarily receives more support
that M1, i.e., the Bayes factor (13) exceeds one.
6.6 Estimator Performance
To help convey the ability of data to discriminate between the three models, we examine w?
values arising for three ensembles of φ† values, where the ensembles are randomly drawn
from pi0(φ), pi1(φ), and pi2(φ) respectively. Equal prior weights w = (1/3, 1/3/1/3) are
employed. The results are plotted in Figure 3. For both the ensembles corresponding to
M0 and M1, we see w
?
2 = 0 for large majorities of points. So M2 is often, but not always,
fully discredited when it is false. On the other hand, when M2 is not discredited (the
minorities of scenarios arising under M0 and M1, but all the scenarios arising under M2),
it receives strong support. The w?2 values range from 0.72 and 0.92.
When we focus on the w?2 = 0 cases generated under M0 and M1 we see modest discrim-
inatory power in the form of a modest tendency for w?1 = 1−w?0 to be smaller when M0 is
true and larger when M1 is true. Still focussing on these cases, we also see an asymmetry.
The most extreme evidence in favour of M0 corresponds to a value of w
?
0 = 1 − w?1 well
below one (approximately w?0 = 0.73), and this extreme can be reached when M1 is true as
well as when M0 is true. On the other hand, there are some narrow circumstances under
which w?1 = 1−w?0 is very close to one. This asymmetry echoes what was seen in Example
3. There is more scope to support the identifying restriction M1 than there is to criticize
it.
The RAMSE values for this example appear in Table 4. As per Example 3, we see fairly
high stakes involved with the investigator invoking the maybe assumptions. RAMSE is
increased by 31% in terms of average performance across scenarios where neither restriction
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Figure 3: Distribution of the limiting posterior weights (w?0, w
?
1, w
?
2), in Example 4, under
M0 (upper-left), M1 (upper-right), and M2 (lower-left). In each instance, an ensemble
of 100 φ† points are simulated from pij(). Points in the upper panels are jittered with a
small amount of random noise, in order to better see the distribution of those points with
w?0 + w
?
1 = 1, w
?
2 = 0.
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Table 4: RAMSE values for different combinations of Nature’s prior and the investigator’s
prior in Example 4. Each value is computed as a Monte Carlo average, using 1600 draws
from each of pi0(), pi1(), pi2(). The impact of the investigator using piMIX rather than pi0 is a
31.3% increase in RAMSE when this use is not warranted, but a 39.5% decrease in RAMSE
when it is warranted. Monte Carlo standard errors for these two percentage changes are
4.0 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points, respectively.
Investigator
pi0 piMIX
Nature pi0 0.0452 0.0594
piMIX 0.0778 0.0470
holds. Whereas RAMSE is reduced by 40% in terms of average performance when the mix
of scenarios indeed has one of the restrictions holding in a portion of cases.
7 Discussion
Of course, there is no free lunch. When specifying a prior distribution, we implicitly choose
the estimator with optimal average-case behavior, where the average is with respect to the
joint distribution of parameters and data arising from the specified prior. In situations with
one or more plausible identifying restrictions, we have seen the stakes associated with prior
assertions can be quite high. In one direction, AMSE(pi0, piMIX) can be substantially higher
than AMSE(pi0, pi0). Purely wishful thinking that perhaps an identifying restriction holds
can come with a steep penalty. Equally, however, AMSE(piMIX , piMIX) can be substantially
lower than AMSE(piMIX , pi0). Realistic assessment that perhaps an identifying restriction
holds comes with a reward.
Our examples included some identifying restrictions that are empirically untestable,
in the sense that w∗1/w
?
0 is neither zero nor infinite, i.e., even an infinite amount of data
would neither definitively prove nor definitively disprove the identifying assumption. In
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some such cases, however, the positive and finite value of w∗1/w
?
0 does vary with the un-
derlying parameter values θ† (via dependence on φ†). Thus a nuanced situation of partial
learning about the plausibility of a restriction can result. Consequently, the pros and cons
of making “perhaps” suppositions a priori are not easily and generally intuited. In a given
problem, however, analysis of the kind demonstrated in this paper can reveal the structure
of inference. Consequently, the risks and rewards of giving some prior credence to one or
more identifying restrictions can be quantified.
Supplementary Materials
R code to produce all the empirical results in the paper will be made available online via
a GitHub repository.
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